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INTRODUCTION
HONORABLE DOLORES K. SLOVITER
CHIEF JUDGE
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
I am honored to have been asked to introduce the special
20th Anniversary Issue of the Third Circuit Review. The intro-
ductory issue and the 10th Anniversary Issue were both intro-
duced by my colleague, then Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz. At the
inception, he challenged the Villanova Law Review to combine
"analysis with perspective," reminding the student writers and
editors that judges operate under constraints that do not bind
their reviewers.' Ten years later, he charged the Review to con-
tinue to concentrate in depth on the factors that are critical to
probing analysis.2 These remarks still retain their pertinence.
After two decades of Third Circuit Reviews there is now a
body of publications that permits us to put the work in perspec-
tive. I note initially that Villanova Law Review's undertaking to
study the work of the Third Circuit year after year accentuates the
symbiotic relationship that exists between the court and the law
schools within its geographic area. A law school as close as Villa-
nova is to the nerve center of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in Philadelphia has a number of opportunities to use the court as
a resource. It is convenient for students to work in the judges'
chambers as interns in the summer, and sometimes part-time dur-
ing the academic year. The law school administration often calls
upon area judges to teach courses at the law school as adjunct
faculty or to lecture on specific topics. The Philadelphia area
judges frequently accept the law school's request to participate in
its moot court competitions. In this manner, Villanova law stu-
dents have become familiar with the work of the judges and the
courts within the Third Circuit, leading many of them to seek and
secure clerkships in those courts. In effect, the area courts serve
as a valuable training ground for many Villanova students.
At the same time, the judges are the beneficiaries of the unin-
hibited ideas and perceptive questions that often occur to those
1. CollinsJ. Seitz, Introduction, Third Circuit Review, 19 VILL. L. REV. 279, 280
(1973).
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with a fresh approach. Judges need to be asked "Why?" and
"Why not?" more regularly. A law journal's annual review of the
court's cases provides that opportunity. Among other reasons, it
is more likely to be read by the judges of that court than is an
isolated casenote on one of the court's opinions appearing in a
distant law journal.
At the same time, of course, the casenotes that comprise the
annual review are the vehicle for the law review writers and edi-
tors to study intensively the area of the law at issue. The style of
casenotes that was in vogue when I was an editor of a different law
review are in disuse today. Then, we would compress into four or
five paragraphs the facts and holding of the case, the legal issue,
the wide range of precedent, the arguments pro and con, and our
conclusion which, typical of student analysis, was frequently criti-
cal. 3 It was a useful academic exercise, and the need to be concise
forged a discipline of restraint with language that remains with
many of us decades later.
On the other hand, casenotes of that ilk have now become
obsolete in this day of computerized legal research, when a few
key punches can bring forth all the relevant citations. The inevi-
table time lag between an opinion's publication and its review in a
law journal generally makes most student comment about the
case redundant. Even if the United States Supreme Court has not
already ruled on the subject in the interim, other courts of ap-
peals will have extensively analyzed the case under consideration.
It follows that the casenotes in the Villanova Third Circuit Re-
views, as in most law reviews today, generally contain discussions
more extensive than the particular case.
As I reviewed the Third Circuit Reviews for the past twenty
years in preparation for this introduction, it seemed to me that
the basis for the inclusion of the reviewed cases was not always
clear. Some years the Annual Review has featured cases that
would be on any objective observer's list of the most significant
recent Third Circuit cases.4 Surprisingly, other equally, if not
3. See, e.g., Recent Cases, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1954).
4. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Pennhurst residents have right to treatment or habilitation
in least restrictive environment under federal and state statutes), reviewed by
Frederick C. Bader, Third Circuit Review, 25 VILL. L. REV. 884, 1054 (1979-80);
In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (Sev-
enth Amendment does not guarantee jury trial where facts and issues too com-
plex for resolution by jury), reviewed by Mark L. Collins, Third Circuit Review, 26
VILL. L. REV. 559, 720 (1980-81); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
.Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer program, whether in object code
1090
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more, influential decisions have been overlooked. 5
Some of the Third Circuit Review Editors have recognized
the limitations of the conventional series of unrelated casenotes
and have been willing to experiment with more innovative for-
mats. One of the most successful, for this reader, was the format
chosen by the 1979 Third Circuit Review Editor Dieter G.
Struzyna who explained that that issue included, in addition to
the conventional casenote for review of single decisions, "more
expansive 'mini-comments' and 'comments' for analyses of
broader areas of the law."' 6 He expressed his view "that this for-
mat facilitates the widest possible coverage of recent develop-
ments within the Third Circuit without sacrificing the neutral
perspective which only an academic context provides."
'7
One particular advantage of the Volume 24 format was the
decision to divide the review into topic areas, so that comments,
mini-comments, and casenotes relating to a particular topic were
grouped together. Such grouping permits the law review to study
the unique culture that each court develops over time. I define
"culture" for this purpose as the court's method of approaching
and deciding legal issues, which is essentially the analytic frame-
work by which the court approaches cases before it, and which
may, but does not necessarily, affect the outcome of the appeal. It
is more a question of the direction the court will take in analyzing
an issue than determining how the issue will be resolved. Some
members of the court may be aware of it only intuitively, adopting
the court's culture by group dynamic.
Intensive study of the court's decisions in a discrete field of
law helps explain the court's approach to practicing lawyers,
whose knowledge of the court is often confined to cases in which
they are involved. An annual review of the court's leading deci-
sions in a particular area offers a significant opportunity to delve
beyond the disposition of a single case to the more difficult mat-
ter of the court's approach to a line of cases. Admittedly, this may
be too ambitious a project for an exclusively student-written and
student-edited publication. The studies of this type devoted to
or source code, is "literary work" subject to copyright), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984) reviewed by Janet E. Fisher, Third Circuit Review, 29 VILL. L. REV.
741, 894 (1983-84).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (declin-
ing to apply Frye test focusing exclusively on general acceptance to determine
admissibility of novel scientific evidence).
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the Third Circuit that have been written were undertaken by
faculty members.8
Indeed, one may legitimately ask whether it is presumptuous
to suggest that the jurisprudence of a court of appeals merits the
type of concentration usually reserved for the Supreme Court.
Obviously, the Supreme Court's decisions have a permanence
that no lower court can approach.
On the other hand, the Villanova Law Review made the deci-
sion 20 years ago that it was appropriate to devote a substantial
portion of one issue to the Third Circuit's decisions. As a reader
with a particular interest, I believe that decision continues to be
justifiable. The Supreme Court has, in recent years, reviewed less
than one percent of the decisions of federal courts of appeals. 9
Therefore, almost all of our decisions are effectively the final
word in the case at hand. The value of a concentrated focus on
the court's decisions in a defined area of law is that it illuminates
the nature of the judicial process as well as explicates the substan-
tive law.
For example, I have not seen any study in a lawjournal of the
Third Circuit's relatively recent opinions interpreting the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988), although the Review has recently published
a useful symposium on some issues under RICO.10 I have the
impression that such a study from the "neutral academic perspec-
tive" referred to by Mr. Struzyna would be highly revelatory of
our general approach in statutory cases. A brief review of some
of those cases may illustrate the point.
When the Supreme Court decided in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co.," that the Second Circuit had erred in requiring a "racketeer-
ing injury" to sustain a RICO claim, and that the only injury nec-
essary to confer standing on a plaintiff is injury flowing from the
predicate acts, the lower federal courts were left to face the in-
creasing application of RICO in contexts beyond the organized
crime scenario that had precipitated its enactment.
The Third Circuit followed the lead of Sedima in declining "to
8. See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, Award of the Costs of Taking An Appeal in the
Third Circuit, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1005 (1986).
9. See THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 260
(Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989), corrected by Errata Sheet (June
18, 1990).
10. See Symposium, RICO: Something for Everyone, 35 VILL. L. REV. 853
(1990).
11. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
1092 [Vol. 38: p. 1089
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read additional limits into RICO once a plaintiff has made out all
of the elements required for a finding of liability under the stat-
ute's explicit provisions."' 2 However, as we began to parse the
statutory components of a RICO cause of action, we found ample
bases to confine the type of claims that could be filed.
By far the most troublesome issue under RICO during this
period of time was divining what Congress meant when it pro-
scribed a "pattern of racketeering activity" in section 1962(a).13
Judge Seitz, writing for the court in Barticheck v. Fidelity Union
Bank/First National State,' 4 expressed "concern over civil RICO's
increasing use in attempts to reach 'garden variety' business fraud
and the potential utility of the pattern requirement as a means of
curtailing this trend."' 5 Thus, Barticheck enunciated a test for
"pattern" that considered "the number of unlawful acts, the
length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity
of the acts, the number of victims, the number of perpetrators,
and the character of the unlawful activity."' 6
Barticheck was approvingly cited by the Supreme Court when
it first considered the pattern requirement in H.J. Inc. v. Northwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co.' 7 Although the Court held that a single
scheme to bribe state officials over a six-year period stated a valid
claim under RICO, the Court also stated that the predicate acts
must show both continuity and relationship to constitute a pat-
tern under RICO. The Court's definition of continuity was some-
what elusive,' 8 and the lower courts struggled to apply the test in
diverse fact situations.
An early post-H.J. Inc. Third Circuit case found plaintiffs' al-
legations sufficient to withstand dismissal on pattern grounds,' 9
12. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). That section of the statute provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ...
to use or invest... any part of such income... in acquisition of... or
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
14. 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987).
15. Id. at 40.
16. Id. at 39.
17. 492 U.S. 229, 235 n.2, 241 (1989).
18. See id. at 241.
19. See, e.g., Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989) (single injury,
single victim doesn't foreclose pattern in light of allegations of numerous predi-
cate acts of wire and mail fraud made over a period of fourteen months); Shearin
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but shortly thereafter we began to apply a common sense ap-
proach, influenced by our view of the congressional intent. In
Marshall-Silver Construction Co. v. Mendel,20 we held that Congress
would not have intended RICO to apply in a case in which the
threats to put a construction company out of business occurred
over only five days, followed by a bankruptcy filing and media
publicity that terminated after seven months. 2' We stated that
RICO should apply only to a significant societal threat, and sug-
gested that the scheme at issue was yet another example of a
"garden variety fraud." 22
Likewise, in Banks v. Wolk 23 we noted that "H.J. Inc. had not
rendered obsolete our prior multi-factor pattern inquiry" under
Barticheck.24 Applying this analysis, we affirmed the dismissal of
allegations against certain individual defendants because, as to
them, the scheme was an attempt to "defraud a single investor of
his interest in a single piece of real estate over a relatively short
period of time," "amount[ing] to nothing more than an isolated
incident of 'garden variety' real estate fraud."
25
We continued this somewhat narrow view of the pattern re-
quirement in Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc. ,26 where we applied
the Barticheck factors to uphold dismissal of a RICO complaint
against a bank and several individual defendants because the
complaint merely alleged "a short-term attempt to force a single
entity into bankruptcy, and contain[ed] no additional threat of
continued criminal activity." 27 We reconciled the state of RICO
law in the Third Circuit in Hindes v. Castle,28 where we upheld dis-
missal of a RICO claim by an unsuccessful candidate for Lieuten-
ant Governor of Delaware against the successful candidates for
Governor and Lieutenant Governor. We concluded that because
the allegedly fraudulent solicitation of campaign contributions
ended with the election, there was no threat of continuing racke-
teering activity and hence there was no claim under RICO. We
explained that we would continue to add to the body of RICO
to defraud investors and employees lasting two years sufficed to allege RICO
pattern).
20. 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990).
21. Id. at 597.
22. Id.
23. 918 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990).
24. Id. at 423.
25. Id. at 422, 423.
26. 926 F.2d 1406 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
27. Id. at 1417.
28. 937 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1991).
1094 [Vol. 38: p. 1089
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case law incrementally "[u]ntil the Supreme Court further clari-
fies the RICO requirements or Congress takes some action to
throw more light on the elements of the claim." 2
9
The restrained approach by the Third Circuit in interpreting
the pattern requirement of RICO has also been applied to other
statutory elements. In Brittingham v. Mobil Corp.,3° a case arising
under section 1962(a), which prohibits the use or investment of
racketeering income, we focused on the need to show an injury
different from that caused by the pattern of racketeering. Be-
cause the injury alleged was merely the investment of the money
derived from the corporate activity, we sustained the dismissal.
31
Similarly, under section 1962(b), which proscribes acquiring
an interest in the enterprise through a pattern of engineering, we
have held that there must be a nexus shown between the interest
acquired and the alleged racketeering activity. 32
We applied this precedent in our recent opinion in Lightning
Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,33 where we sustained a dismissal of the
section 1962(b) charge for failure of the complaint to explain
what additional injury resulted from the defendant's interest or
control of the enterprise. Finally, our opinions under section
1962(c) have strictly applied the requirement that the "person"
charged with a violation of section 1962(c) must be distinct from
the "enterprise."
34
In short, our RICO cases seem to have been characterized by
our view that "civil RICO does not become the claim of choice for
every fraud suit," 35 and reflect our deference to what we under-
stand to have been Congress' underlying intent in enacting
RICO. It is likely that the judges of the court are too close to the
opinions to be able to analyze what they show about our court's
process of statutory interpretation, but some careful objective ob-
server may be able to draw some insights from them. Indeed,
while this Introduction is not the vehicle to compare our RICO
interpretations with those of one or more of the other circuits, it
also would be instructive if some student editor were to consider
29. Id. at 876.
30. 943 F.2d 297, 303-05 (3d Cir. 1991).
31. Id. at 299; accord Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702, 708-10 (3d Cir. 1991).
32. See, e.g., Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990).
33. Nos. 92-5476, 92-5543, slip op. at 60, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23286 (3d
Cir. Sept. 10, 1993).
34. See, e.g., id. at 61, 63; Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-
34 (3d Cir. 1984).
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whether our approach has been characteristic of that utilized by
our sister courts or is, instead, unique to us.
Another promising area for commentators interested in the
evolution of Third Circuit law is our court's series of cases devel-
oping the common-law right of access to judicial records and doc-
uments. The highly publicized Abscam prosecutions compelled
us to confront what had become a relatively closed access policy
in many of the district courts in this circuit (and undoubtedly else-
where as well). The trial of two present and past members of
Philadelphia's City Council featured video and audio tapes that
graphically showed the defendants' participation in some of the
Abscam activities charged. When the district court denied per-
mission to the networks to copy, for the purpose of broadcasting
to the public, tapes that had been admitted into evidence, this
court reversed, enunciating in Criden I a pervasive common-law
right "to inspect and copy public records and documents, includ-
ing judicial records and documents." 36
After that opinion, we were faced in other cases with a series
of appeals by parties or representatives of news media seeking to
enforce the public right to inspect and copy judicial records, and
we consistently applied the presumption of public access, irre-
spective of the composition of the panels that heard the appeal.
Thus, in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,37 we held that presump-
tion was applicable to transcripts of a hearing for a preliminary
injunction. 38 In later cases we applied the same presumption to
settlement documents that were on file with the court, notwith-
standing the view prevailing in some quarters, including district
courts, that such documents are inherently confidential.3 9
Similarly, under our broad view of the right of public access
we held that papers filed in connection with a motion for sum-
mary judgment in a case arising out of alleged bribes by Westing-
house to Philippine public officials should no longer be sealed,40
36. United States v. Criden (Criden I), 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981)
(quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)); see
also United States v. Criden (Criden I1), 681 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982) (ordering
release of tapes with certain redactions).
37. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
38. Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that transcripts of conferences at sidebar or in chambers were presumptively
available).
39. See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986).
40. See Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d
653 (3d Cir. 1991).
1096 [Vol. 38: p. 1089
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and that the transcript of a civil trial and exhibits admitted in evi-
dence relating to highly publicized cigarette lighter accidents
were to be made available to interested persons. 4'
In our most recent foray into this field of law, we continued
our trend toward open access, concluding that the presumptive
right of public access that we had sustained as to summary judg-
ment material applied as well to other pretrial motions of a
nondiscovery nature, whether preliminary or dispositive, and to
the material filed in connection therewith, but we declined to ex-
tend that right as to discovery motions and their supporting
documents.
42
Our commitment to the principle of public access to filed
documents has also been evident when the issue has been access
to judicial hearings. Thus, in an appeal by news gathering organi-
zations and individual reporters who had been excluded, along
with the public, from a pretrial suppression hearing in a criminal
case against a defendant described as "a powerful and prominent
politician in Philadelphia," we reiterated the importance of a pub-
lic trial in criminal cases. 43 Because we could no longer direct
that a hearing already completed be opened to the public, we re-
quired that the district court take immediate steps to make avail-
able to the public the record of the hitherto closed hearing.4
4
That issue arose again in the Abscam cases, where once again
a district court held in camera hearings, this time in connection
with pretrial motions to dismiss filed by defendants. In reversing,
we enunciated the broad principles that
(1) the public has a first amendment right of access to
pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment
hearings;
(2) that motions for closure of such hearings must be
posted on the docket to give notice to the public; and
(3) that a district court, before closing a pretrial hearing,
must consider alternatives to closure and state on the
record its reasons for rejecting them.45
41. Littlejohn v. BIG Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1991).
42. See Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d
157 (3d Cir. 1993).
43. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 842 (3d Cir. 1978) (relying on
Sixth Amendment), criticized by Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 381 n.9
(1979) (criticizing Third Circuit's decision in Gannett for departing from plain
meaning of language of Sixth Amendment).
44. See id. at 860.
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It may be that a comparison of our expansive approach to the
public right of access with our restrictive approach to the ele-
ments of RICO reflects only the difference between our obliga-
tion to be deferential to Congress when interpreting statutes and
the freedom we exercise in our occasional forays into federal
common law. If these lines of cases reflect some other trends,
they require more objective study than can be given by those of
us who are participants in the process.
I do not suggest that the Third Circuit Review editors rush to
assign to second year law review students preparation of com-
ments on either the Third Circuit's RICO cases or our right to
access cases. In fact, the 1985 Third Circuit Review contained a
casenote on Publicker which, in the footnote discussion, referred
to some of the earlier Third Circuit cases on right of access. 46 It
may be that because Publicker was decided early in our series of
cases it could not have been recognized as part of a continuum of
cases expanding the common-law right of access.
All I am suggesting is that there is room for analysis of the
developing jurisprudence by the Third Circuit in discrete areas of
the law, if promising areas can be identified. In that event, stu-
dent commentary more expansive than casenotes might be of
value to both the students and profession.
In this connection, it is of some interest that a recent survey
by Stanford Law Review of law review usage by attorneys, profes-
sors, state judges and federal judges rated the value of student-
written notes almost equal to that of student-written case com-
mentaries. 47 This suggests that not all readers will agree with my
preference for inclusion in the Third Circuit Review of student-
written developments focused on one topic or related topics. I
certainly do not intend to discourage inclusion of casenotes in the
annual review. The careful study of an appellate opinion, the rel-
evant authority, and the opposing arguments has important edu-
cational value.
Nonetheless, I would hope that the Third Circuit Review edi-
tors would at least give some consideration to the value of longer
development pieces. Such projects offer the advantage of requir-
ing several students to work together in research and writing of a
46. See Wendy L. Bell, Third Circuit Review, 30 VILL. L. REV. 980, 986 n.3 1,
989 n.49 (1985); see also Stephen V. Siana, Third Circuit Review, 28 VILL. L. REV.
723, 729-30 (1982-83) (reviewing Criden II and discussing relationship with
Cianfrani).
47. See Max Stier et al., Project Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improve-
ment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467, 1496 (1992).
1098 [Vol. 38: p. 1089
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longer piece, an experience that could prove useful for later pro-
fessional development. Indeed, some former law review editors
surveyed by Stanford noted the absence of such an experience. 48
Whatever format the Third Circuit Reviews take in future
years, the past twenty years have shown that they provide stu-
dents an opportunity to intensively study selected areas of the
law, to review critically and constructively the work of their peers,
and to perfect rigorous legal analysis and writing. We of the
Third Circuit are privileged that our work product is the subject
of such concentrated academic attention, and we eagerly look for-
ward to each year's forthcoming issue.
48. See id. at 1491-92.
11
Sloviter: Introduction
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
